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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge 
 
In this immigration case, we consider the term 
“particular social group,” which is part of the definition of 
“refugee” in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  We must decide whether a revised 
interpretation of that term by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (the “BIA” or the “Board”) is reasonable and 
therefore entitled to deference under the strictures of 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Like other circuit courts, we had 
dutifully deferred to the initial interpretation of that term 
given by the Board in Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 
233 (BIA 1985), overruled on other grounds by Matter of 
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).  Fatin v. I.N.S., 
12 F.3d 1233, 1239-40 (3d Cir. 1993).  But, over time, the 
Board began adding new requirements to its test for 
determining whether an applicant had established the 
existence of a particular social group and could thereby claim 
refugee status.  In Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General, 
663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011), we concluded that the BIA had 
departed from Acosta without a principled explanation and 
that its new requirements for proving a particular social group 
were incapable of consistent application.  We therefore held 
that its interpretation of “particular social group” was not 
entitled to Chevron deference.  Id. at 608. 
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The BIA has since responded to our concerns.  In a 
pair of precedential decisions, Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & 
N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014), and Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. 
Dec. 208 (BIA 2014), affirmed in part, vacated and 
remanded in part on other grounds sub nom. Reyes v. Lynch, 
842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016), it articulated a three-part test 
for proving the existence of a cognizable particular social 
group.  The test requires applicants to “establish that the 
group [at issue] is (1) composed of members who share a 
common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with 
particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in 
question.”  M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 237.  We now hold 
that that statutory interpretation is entitled to Chevron 
deference, and, applying the newly framed test here, we 
conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s 
determination that the petitioner has not met its requirements.  
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
I. BACKGROUND1 
 
S.E.R.L., a native of Honduras, seeks review of the 
denial of her application for asylum and statutory withholding 
                                              
1 We accept the agency’s factual findings as 
conclusive, unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary[.]”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).  We therefore recite the facts as found by the 
immigration judge, who determined that S.E.R.L. testified 
credibly and afforded her testimony full evidentiary weight, 
and as accepted by the BIA.  We supplement the facts with 
additional details found in S.E.R.L.’s affidavit and testimony, 
where consistent with those findings. 
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of removal based on membership in a proposed particular 
social group that she characterizes as “immediate family 
members of Honduran women unable to leave a domestic 
relationship[.]”2  (Opening Br. at 21.)  She fears persecution 
by two men, Jose Angel and Juan Orellana.  Jose Angel 
abducted, raped, and continues to stalk one of S.E.R.L.’s 
daughters, K.Y.R.L.  That daughter has already been granted 
asylum in the United States.  Juan Orellana is S.E.R.L.’s 
stepfather and has repeatedly abused S.E.R.L.’s mother.  
S.E.R.L. fears that if she is removed to Honduras, both men 
will persecute her, Jose Angel because of her relationship to 
her daughter, and Juan Orellana because of her relationship to 
her mother.   
 
S.E.R.L. and two of her children fled here from 
Honduras in 2014.  Within a month of their unlawful arrival, 
the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal 
proceedings pursuant to INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i).3  S.E.R.L. 
                                              
2 This petition for review was filed on behalf of 
S.E.R.L., as well as two of her minor children, Y.N.S.R. and 
Y.Y.R.L.  The children are derivative applicants on 
S.E.R.L.’s application for asylum and related relief, so we 
will refer to S.E.R.L. as the petitioner, in the singular. 
 
3 That statutory subsection provides: 
 
An alien present in the United States without 
being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the 
United States at any time or place other than as 
designated by the Attorney General, is 
inadmissible. 
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conceded removability, and timely applied for asylum and 
statutory withholding of removal.4  In support of her claims 
for relief, she alleged past persecution and a fear of future 
persecution based on the relationships just noted.     
 
An immigration judge (“IJ”) reviewed S.E.R.L.’s 
application and conducted a merits hearing.  Although finding 
her credible, the IJ concluded that S.E.R.L. had not met her 
burden to establish eligibility for any of the relief she had 
requested.  According to the IJ, S.E.R.L. had not established 
past persecution or an objectively reasonable fear of future 
persecution by Jose Angel, given that he had targeted 
S.E.R.L.’s daughter, not her.  Though crediting S.E.R.L.’s 
testimony about Juan Orellana’s abuse of her mother and past 
threats directed at S.E.R.L., herself, the IJ also noted that 
S.E.R.L. said “her stepfather never physically harmed her.”  
(Administrative Record (“AR”) at 86.)  The IJ did not state 
whether S.E.R.L. had established past persecution by Juan 
Orellana.     
 
The IJ did say that, even if she had suffered past 
persecution, S.E.R.L. failed to establish that the harm she 
suffered was on account of a protected ground.  Applying the 
BIA’s newly clarified three-part test from M-E-V-G-, the IJ 
rejected S.E.R.L.’s argument that “immediate family 
members of Honduran women unable to leave a domestic 
relationship” constituted a cognizable group.  (AR at 89-90.)  
According to the IJ, the group “lack[ed] the requisite level of 
                                                                                                     
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). 
 
4 S.E.R.L. also initially sought protection under the 
Convention Against Torture but no longer pursues that relief.   
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particularity and social distinction” and thus failed the test’s 
second and third requirements.  (AR at 90.)  The IJ also noted 
that “asylum and refugee laws do not protect people from 
general conditions of strife, such as crime and other societal 
afflictions.”  (AR at 90 (quoting M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 
235).)  Consequently, the IJ denied relief and ordered that 
S.E.R.L. be removed.5   
 
She appealed that decision to the BIA.  It too 
concluded that she had not met her burden to establish 
eligibility for either asylum or withholding of removal.  It 
agreed with the IJ’s conclusion that she had not established 
past persecution by Jose Angel, and it further concluded that 
she had not established past persecution by Juan Orellana, 
because any threats he made “d[id] not rise to the level of 
persecution[.]”  (AR at 4.) 
 
The BIA also agreed that S.E.R.L.’s proposed 
particular social group – immediate family members of 
Honduran women unable to leave a domestic relationship – 
lacked the requisite particularity and social distinction.  As to 
                                              
5 The IJ rejected three other particular social groups 
proposed by S.E.R.L. as alternatives, including (1) Honduran 
women unable to leave a domestic relationship, (2) immediate 
family members of young Honduran women without a father 
in the home, and (3) Honduran women who report gender-
based crimes to the police.  S.E.R.L. has not challenged those 
rulings in her petition to us and so those proposed groups are 
not before us.  See Frias-Camilo v. Att’y Gen., 826 F.3d 699, 
701 n.1 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that a petitioner’s failure to 
challenge certain portions of the BIA’s decision results in 
waiver). 
9 
 
particularity, the BIA observed that “[the] proposed group 
could include individuals of any age, sex, or background, and 
it is not limited to those who … take overt action to assist, or 
are meaningfully involved with, the family member who is 
unable to leave a domestic relationship.”  (AR at 5.)  The BIA 
further “agree[d] that [S.E.R.L.] ha[d] not presented evidence 
that this group is socially distinct within Honduran society, as 
the record does not reflect that members of such a group 
would be perceived, considered, or recognized in Honduras as 
a distinct group[.]”  (AR at 5.)  Even assuming a cognizable 
particular social group, the Board “discern[ed] no legal error 
or clear factual error” in the IJ’s determination that S.E.R.L. 
had not established a well-founded fear of future persecution 
by Jose Angel.  (AR at 5-6.)  The Board did not, however, 
reach the issue of future persecution by Juan Orellana. 
 
It turned last to the question of withholding of removal 
and concluded that, “[i]nasmuch as [S.E.R.L.] has failed to 
satisfy the lower burden of proof required for asylum, it 
follows that she has failed to satisfy the more stringent 
standard required for withholding of removal[.]”  (AR at 6.)  
The Board thus dismissed the appeal.  S.E.R.L. has timely 
petitioned for review.   
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II. DISCUSSION6 
 
S.E.R.L. contends that she is entitled to asylum and 
withholding of removal because she has established a well-
founded fear of future persecution on account of her 
membership in a legally cognizable particular social group, 
that again being “immediate family members of Honduran 
women unable to leave a domestic relationship[.]”  (Opening 
Br. at 21.)  The parties’ primary dispute is whether the BIA’s 
revised interpretation of “particular social group,” as set forth 
in Matter of M-E-V-G-, warrants Chevron deference.  
S.E.R.L., supported by amici,7 asks us to reject the test from 
M-E-V-G- because it is “deeply flawed,” “has no basis in the 
asylum statute,” and fails to resolve the concerns raised in our 
                                              
6 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1103 and 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b).  Because “denial of … [an] applicant’s 
petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under 
the CAT constitutes a final order of removal,” Shehu v. Att’y 
Gen., 482 F.3d 652, 656 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted), we have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
 
7 We thank the National Immigrant Women’s 
Advocacy Project and the Pennsylvania Coalition Against 
Domestic Violence, and the Center for Gender & Refugee 
Studies, American Immigration Lawyers Association, and 
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society Pennsylvania for filing 
amicus briefs in this matter, which have assisted our 
consideration of the legal issues before us and also shine a 
light on an issue of international concern:  violence against 
women, including Honduran women who intervene on behalf 
of victims suffering from domestic abuse.   
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decision in Valdiviezo-Galdamez.  (Opening Br. at 1-2.)  
Instead, S.E.R.L. argues, we should continue to apply the test 
from Matter of Acosta, which she claims to “satisf[y] … with 
ease.”  (Opening Br. at 22.)  She also says that, in the event 
the Board’s new interpretation is given deference, she has met 
its particularity and social distinction requirements.  Finally, 
she contends that remand is required, if for no other reason, 
because neither the IJ nor the BIA addressed whether she has 
a well-founded fear of future persecution by Juan Orellana.   
 
Before we address those arguments, we first discuss 
the governing legal principles and provide a review of our 
Valdiviezo-Galdamez decision and the BIA’s response in 
M-E-V-G-. 
 
A. General Legal Principles 
 
1. Standard of Review 
 
Whether a petitioner’s “proffered particular social 
group is cognizable under [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)] is a 
question of law … subject to de novo review,” which, we 
have said, is “subject to established principles of [Chevron] 
deference[.]”  Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 
339 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).8  More precisely, the existence of a cognizable 
                                              
8 In cases like this one, we have often described the 
governing standard of review as being “de novo, subject to 
principles of Chevron deference.”  See Mondragon-Gonzalez 
v. Att’y Gen., 884 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2018) (“We accord 
de novo review to questions of law, including the BIA’s 
interpretation of the INA, subject to the deference dictated by 
12 
 
particular social group presents a mixed question of law and 
fact, since the ultimate legal question of cognizability 
depends on underlying factual questions concerning the group 
and the society of which it is a part.  Cf. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 
1240-41 (noting the “sparse” evidence supporting the 
petitioner’s proposed particular social group, and concluding 
that, even if cognizable, “the administrative record does not 
establish that she is a member of [her proposed] group”).  We 
thus review de novo the ultimate legal conclusion as to the 
existence of a particular social group, while we review the 
underlying factual findings for “substantial evidence[.]”  See 
Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(reviewing the BIA’s statutory interpretation of “particular 
social group” in accordance with Chevron principles, and 
stating, “[o]n the other hand, we must treat the BIA’s findings 
of fact as ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator 
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary’” (quoting 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B))). 
 
Whether a petitioner has established membership in a 
particular social group also involves agency fact-finding.  Id. 
at 167, 178-79.  “Our review is confined solely to the 
administrative record,” Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 340, and 
administrative findings of fact are “conclusive unless any 
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 
contrary,” id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).  That 
means that factual “determinations will be upheld if they are 
                                                                                                     
Chevron[.]”).  That may sound like a contradiction in terms.  
What we mean is that we are required by Chevron principles 
to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA, when 
reasonable, but we review de novo any legal challenge to the 
application of that interpretation.   
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supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence 
in the record considered as a whole.”  Kang v. Att’y Gen., 611 
F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 
 
Because here “the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s 
decisions and orders as well as [conducting] an independent 
analysis, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions and 
orders.”  Ordonez-Tevalan v. Att’y Gen., 837 F.3d 331, 340-
41 (3d Cir. 2016).  But we look to the IJ’s opinion “only 
where the BIA has substantially relied on that opinion.”  
Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009), as 
amended (Nov. 4, 2009). 
 
2. Asylum and Withholding of Removal 
 
Under the INA, the Attorney General has the 
discretion to grant asylum to a removable alien, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(A), as long as the alien meets the INA’s 
definition of “refugee.”  That definition is as follows: 
 
Any person who is outside any country of such 
person’s nationality or, in the case of a person 
having no nationality, is outside any country in 
which such person last habitually resided, and 
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is 
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself 
of the protection of, that country because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion[.] 
 
Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).   
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A petitioner has the burden to establish that she is a 
refugee, and thus eligible for asylum relief under the INA.  Id. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B).  One way of doing so is to show “a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of … membership in a 
particular social group[.]”  Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  That is the 
route S.E.R.L. chose to pursue, and so she bore the burden of 
establishing the following elements:  (1) a particular social 
group that is legally cognizable; (2) membership in that 
group; (3) a well-founded fear of persecution, which must be 
subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable; and (4) a 
nexus, or causal link, between the persecution and 
membership in the particular social group.  Fatin, 12 F.3d at 
1240.9 
 
As for withholding of removal, under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3), an alien must “establish a ‘clear probability of 
persecution,’ i.e., that it is more likely than not, that s/he 
would suffer persecution upon returning home.”  Valdiviezo-
                                              
9 Our decision in Fatin v. I.N.S. lays these out as three 
elements, combining into one what we have noted here as 
elements (3) and (4).  See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240 (“The alien 
must … (3) show that he or she would be persecuted or has a 
well-founded fear of persecution based on that 
membership.”).  Because the issue of nexus between alleged 
persecution and membership in a particular social group is 
sometimes the focus of dispute, see Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d 
at 343-45 (reviewing the BIA’s conclusion that the petitioner 
“failed … [to] show her political opinion or her particular 
social group constituted ‘at least one central reason’ for her 
persecution”), we have thought it best to frame it here as a 
separate element of proof. 
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Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 591 (citing I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 
407, 429-30 (1984)).  “Since [that] standard is more 
demanding than that governing eligibility for asylum, an alien 
who fails to qualify for asylum is necessarily ineligible for 
withholding of removal.”  Id. 
 
B. Our Decision in Valdiviezo-Galdamez and the 
BIA’s Response in Matter of M-E-V-G- 
 
In Valdiviezo-Galdamez, we reviewed at length the 
BIA’s evolving efforts to interpret the term “particular social 
group,” beginning with the definition it set forth in Matter of 
Acosta.  We need not fully repeat that history here but, for 
purposes of our analysis, will summarize a few important 
points from the pertinent decisions of the BIA. 
 
From 1985 to 2006, the Board interpreted “particular 
social group” to mean “a group of persons all of whom share 
a common, immutable characteristic.”  Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 
663 F.3d at 595 (quoting Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233).  
That standard became known as the Acosta test.  It was rooted 
in the interpretive doctrine of ejusdem generis, which teaches 
that words in a list should be understood as referring to things 
of the same general class or kind.  Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 
233.  In the context of the statutory definition of “refugee,” 
that means that the term “particular social group” should be 
understood as being akin to the other characteristics listed in 
the definition, namely race, religion, nationality, and political 
opinion.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also 
id. §§ 1158(b)(1), 1231(b)(3).  According to the BIA, all of 
those focus on “an immutable characteristic,” which the BIA 
explained includes both those characteristics that are 
technically “immutable” as well as those a person “should not 
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be required” to change “as a matter of conscience” to avoid 
persecution.  Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233-34.  Thus, the 
Acosta test required members of a “particular social group” to 
have “a common, immutable characteristic” that “the group 
either cannot change, or should not be required to change 
because it is fundamental to their individual identities or 
consciences.”  Id.  The BIA listed examples of innate 
characteristics, like “sex, color, or kinship ties[.]”  Id.  It also 
noted that, in certain circumstances, “a shared past experience 
such as former military leadership or land ownership” could 
be the defining characteristic of a cognizable “particular 
social group,” but such determinations would be made “on a 
case-by-case basis.”10  Id. 
 
Over time, employing the Acosta test, the BIA 
recognized several particular social groups based on 
discernable and immutable characteristics.  For example, in In 
re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337 (BIA 1996), it accepted “kinship” 
as an immutable characteristic, concluding that “[t]he record 
before us makes clear not only that the Marehan [– a familial 
sub-clan in Somalia –] share ties of kinship, but that they are 
identifiable as a group based upon linguistic commonalities.”  
Id. at 343.  Importantly, however, in other cases, the Board 
accepted particular social groups that did not share such 
plainly discernable characteristics.  In Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. 
                                              
10 In Acosta, itself, the petitioner had claimed 
persecution on account of his membership in a group of San 
Salvador taxi drivers who refused to participate in guerrilla-
sponsored work stoppages.  Id. at 216-17.  The BIA rejected 
that proposed group under the “immutable characteristic” test, 
concluding that a taxi driver could change his occupation and 
avoid the danger he faced.  Id. at 233-34. 
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& N. Dec. 658 (BIA 1988), it recognized the status of being a 
former policeman as an innate characteristic and, although not 
definitively reaching the issue in that case, it stated that 
mistreatment because of that status could constitute 
persecution on account of political opinion or membership in 
a particular social group.  Id. at 662-63.  In Matter of Toboso-
Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (BIA 1990), it accepted a 
particular social group of homosexuals in Cuba.  Id. at 822-
23.  And in In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996), it 
accepted the particular social group of “young women of the 
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had [female genital 
mutilation], as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the 
practice.”  Id. at 365. 
 
Eventually, the BIA determined that the Acosta test 
had proven to be over-inclusive and unworkable, in part 
because it encompassed virtually any past acts or experiences, 
since the past cannot be changed and is, by definition, 
immutable.  Thus, in 1999, the BIA began supplementing the 
Acosta test with additional requirements.  Valdiviezo-
Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 596-97.  For example, in In re R-A-, 
22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999; A.G. 2001), remanded for 
reconsideration in Matter of R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 
2008),11 it took issue with particular social groups that were 
“defined principally, if not exclusively, for the purposes of 
                                              
11 In that case, the Attorney General remanded the case 
for reconsideration in light of the Board’s intervening 
decisions.  See Matter of R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 630 (citing 
Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (BIA 2008); Matter of 
S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 2008); In re A-M-E- & 
J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (BIA 2007); In re C-A-, 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006)). 
18 
 
[litigation] … without regard to the question of whether 
anyone in [a given country] perceives [those] group[s] to exist 
in any form whatsoever.”  Id. at 918.  Although the Board 
maintained that the Acosta test was the starting point for 
assessing particular social groups, it said that the test would 
no longer be the ending point.  Id. at 919.  Other factors 
would be considered, including whether the alleged defining 
characteristic of the social group is important within the 
society in question and whether that society understands or 
recognizes the proposed social group as a distinct segment of 
the population.  Id. at 918-19.   
 
By 2006, the BIA appeared to have transformed its 
requirements for establishing a particular social group into a 
new three-part test:  (1) the original Acosta test, requiring 
members to have a common, immutable characteristic; (2) 
social visibility, meaning that members of the social group 
are visible and recognizable by others in the society in 
question; and (3) particularity, meaning that the group has 
defined boundaries.  See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 
599 (citing a pair of BIA cases as establishing the social 
visibility and particularity requirements, In re C-A-, 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. 
Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006), and In re A-M-E- 
& J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (BIA 2007), aff’d sub nom. 
Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007)).  
Although several of our sister courts of appeals gave Chevron 
deference to that interpretation,12 we, along with the Seventh 
                                              
12 See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 603 n.16 
(noting that the First, Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits had accepted the BIA’s three-part definition without 
issue). 
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Circuit, rejected the BIA’s social visibility and particularity 
requirements.  Id. at 603-09; see also Benitez Ramos v. 
Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 
F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 
In Valdiviezo-Galdamez, we took issue with the BIA’s 
departure from Acosta.  663 F.3d at 603-09; see also id. at 
613 (Hardiman, J., concurring).  Two specific concerns 
animated our analysis.  First, we said that the BIA had applied 
the “social visibility” requirement in an “inconsistent” 
manner.  Id. at 603-04.  Specifically, we expressed concern 
that, in cases like In re C-A-, the Board had referred to “social 
visibility” as “recognizability” and as “involv[ing] 
characteristics that were highly visible and recognizable by 
others in the country in question,” id. at 603 (quoting 
C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 959-60), yet in other cases, it had 
accepted particular social groups for refugee status based on 
internal characteristics that lacked any apparent visibility, 
absent self-disclosure, including “women who are opposed to 
female genital mutilation (Matter of Kasinga), homosexuals 
required to register in Cuba, (Matter of Toboso-Alfonso), and 
former members of the El Salvador national police (Matter of 
Fuentes).”  Id. at 604.   
 
We cited the Seventh Circuit’s criticism that “[o]ften it 
is unclear whether the Board is using the term ‘social 
visibility’ in the literal sense, or in the ‘external criterion’ 
sense, or even whether it understands the difference.”  Id. at 
606 (quoting Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430).  Because the 
BIA had applied the social visibility requirement 
inconsistently, we concluded that it was “an unreasonable 
addition to the requirements for establishing refugee status 
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where that status turns upon persecution on account of 
membership in a particular social group.”  Id. at 604.  
 
Second, we said that social visibility and particularity 
“appear to be different articulations of the same concept,” id. 
at 608, at least as the BIA had defined them in prior 
decisions.  Id. at 607.  To illustrate the point, we quoted the 
decision in Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 
2008), in which the BIA described the “essence” of 
particularity as an assessment of “whether the proposed group 
can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct 
that the group would be recognized, in the society in question, 
as a discrete class of persons,” and noted that the size of the 
group “may be an important factor[.]”  Id. at 607 (quoting 
S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584).  The BIA did go on to say 
that “the key question is whether the proposed description is 
sufficiently particular, or is too amorphous ... to create a 
benchmark for determining group membership,” id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 
584), but what it said about the essence of particularity led us 
to reject the requirement as both confusing and “little more 
than a reworked definition of ‘social visibility[.]’”  Id. at 608. 
 
Having decided that “the BIA’s requirements that a 
‘particular social group’ possess the elements of ‘social 
visibility’ and ‘particularity’ [were] inconsistent with prior 
BIA decisions” and repetitive, we then held that they were not 
entitled to Chevron deference.  Id.  But we expressly noted 
that the BIA was free to depart from or change its 
interpretation of “particular social group,” and that a new 
view could be entitled to deference if supported by a 
“principled reason” and explanation for any new 
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requirements.13  Id.  In the aftermath of Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 
we continued to apply the BIA’s original Acosta test.  See, 
e.g., Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 504 n.5 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“Until the BIA provides an analysis that adequately 
supports its departure from Acosta, we remain bound by the 
well-established definition of ‘particular social group’ found 
in Fatin [where we adopted the Acosta test].”).   
 
The BIA promptly responded to our concerns and 
announced a revised interpretation of “particular social 
group” in Matter of M-E-V-G-, which it also applied in a 
companion case pending in the Ninth Circuit, Matter of 
W-G-R-.  The Board adhered to its more restrictive 
interpretation of particular social group, and it clarified the 
three requirements that an applicant for asylum or 
withholding of removal must satisfy to establish a cognizable 
                                              
13 In a concurring opinion, Judge Hardiman said: 
 
[T]he only problem that I find with the BIA’s 
evolving approach to ‘particular social group’ 
cases is that the Board has failed to 
acknowledge a change in course and 
forthrightly address how that change affects the 
continued validity of conflicting precedent.  
Accordingly, remand is necessary so the Board 
can either choose between its reasonable new 
requirements and its older but equally 
reasonable precedents, or reconcile the two 
interpretations in a coherent way. 
 
Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 612 (Hardiman, J., 
concurring). 
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particular social group.  As stated in M-E-V-G-, an applicant 
must “establish that the [proposed] group is (1) composed of 
members who share a common immutable characteristic, 
(2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within 
the society in question.”  26 I. & N. Dec. at 237. 
 
The BIA reviewed its prior efforts to outline what 
constitutes a “particular social group.”  Id.  It said that the 
addition of “particularity” and “social distinction” as required 
elements is both “consistent with … the language of the 
[INA]” as well as consistent with the interpretation “set forth 
in Matter of Acosta[.]”  Id.; see also id. at 234 (citing earlier 
cases, and stating that it would continue to “adhere to the 
social group requirements announced in” its prior decisions).  
It explained that the INA’s “enumerated grounds of 
persecution have more in common than simply describing 
persecution aimed at an immutable characteristic.  They have 
an external perception component within a given society, 
which … separates various factions within a particular 
society.”  Id. at 236.  In the Board’s view, adding 
“particularity” and “social distinction” as requirements for 
proving a particular social group became necessary, based on 
its experience in cases since Acosta.  Id. at 232-33. 
 
The “particularity” requirement, it said, “is included in 
the plain language of the [statute] and is consistent with the 
specificity by which race, religion, nationality, and political 
opinion are commonly defined.”  Id. at 239.  “Particularity” is 
largely definitional, ensuring that the characteristics defining 
a group “provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls 
within the group.”  Id.  The BIA explained that particularity 
requires the group to be “discrete and have definable 
boundaries” that are not “amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or 
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subjective,” ensuring that an immutable characteristic is 
“sufficiently precise to define a particular social group.”  Id. 
 
The “social distinction” requirement, it said, was a 
reworking of the social visibility requirement and was 
intended to resolve any “misconception” that literal visibility 
was meant.  Id. at 236.  According to the BIA, social visibility 
“was never meant to be read literally.”  Id. at 240.  The 
change in terminology to “social distinction” was made to 
“clarif[y] that social visibility does not mean ‘ocular’ 
visibility – either of the group as a whole or of individuals 
within the group – any more than a person holding a protected 
religious or political belief must be ‘ocularly’ visible to others 
in society.”  Id.  Instead, the Board explained, “[t]o be 
socially distinct, a group need not be seen by society; rather, 
it must be perceived as a group by society.”  Id. 
 
The Board noted our concern about the inconsistent 
application of the former “social visibility” requirement, and 
described why it viewed the revised social distinction 
requirement as nevertheless being an appropriate approach.  It 
stated: 
 
It may not be easy or possible to identify who is 
opposed to [female genital mutilation], who is 
homosexual, or who is a former member of the 
national police.  These immutable 
characteristics are certainly not ocularly visible.  
Nonetheless, a society could still perceive 
[members of those groups] to comprise a 
particular social group for a host of reasons, 
such as sociopolitical or cultural conditions in 
the country. 
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Id. at 240.  
 
For that reason, it said, “the fact that members of a 
particular social group may make efforts to hide their 
membership in the group to avoid persecution does not 
deprive the group of its protected status as a particular social 
group.”  Id.  The BIA also directly addressed its prior 
decision in In re C-A-, stating, “to the extent that [the 
decision] has been interpreted as requiring literal or ‘ocular’ 
visibility, we now clarify that it does not.”  Id. at 246-47.   
 
The BIA then answered our concern that particularity 
and social visibility, now recast as social distinction, are not 
discernibly different.  Id. at 240-41.  Although acknowledging 
that “there is considerable overlap” between particularity and 
social distinction, the BIA explained its view that they are 
both different and necessary.  Id.  It said that, although 
relying on an overlapping body of evidence, “each 
emphasize[s] a different aspect of a particular social group.”  
Id. at 241.  “Particularity” addresses “the ‘outer limits’ of a 
group’s boundaries and is definitional in nature,” whereas 
“social distinction” focuses on “whether the people of a given 
society would perceive a proposed group as sufficiently 
separate or distinct[.]”  Id. 
 
Finally, the BIA also took the opportunity to 
emphasize that “a group’s recognition for asylum purposes is 
determined by the perception of the society in question, rather 
than by the perception of the persecutor.”  Id. at 242.  There 
must be a distinction, the Board explained, between the INA’s 
requirement that an applicant “establish[] the existence of one 
of the enumerated grounds,” including “particular social 
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group,” and the INA’s nexus requirement, which addresses 
whether an applicant has suffered persecution “on account of” 
that enumerated ground.  Id.  Although relevant to the extent 
indicative of society’s views as a whole, the Board stated that 
“persecutory conduct alone cannot define [a particular social] 
group.”  Id.   
 
With that background in mind, we now turn to the 
main dispute in this case – whether the revised test for 
determining the cognizability of a particular social group 
resolves the concerns we raised in Valdiviezo-Galdamez and 
is therefore entitled to Chevron deference.   
 
C. The BIA’s Revised Interpretation of 
“Particular Social Group” is Entitled to 
Chevron Deference 
 
“Congress has charged the Attorney General with 
administering the INA,” who has chosen to delegate that 
authority to the BIA.  Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516-
17 (2009).  And, “[c]onsistent with the rule in Chevron …, 
the BIA is entitled to deference in interpreting ambiguous 
provisions of the INA.”  Id. at 516.  The Supreme Court has 
instructed that “[j]udicial deference in the immigration 
context is of special importance, for executive officials 
exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate 
questions of foreign relations.”  Id. at 517 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted); see also id. (noting that the 
judiciary is not well-suited to assume primary responsibility 
for assessing important diplomatic factors).  Hence, “the BIA 
should be accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous 
statutory terms ‘concrete meaning through a process of case-
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by-case adjudication.’”  Id. (quoting I.N.S. v. Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)). 
 
The familiar Chevron two-step analysis thus applies 
with full force in the immigration context.  When 
“considering an interpretation adopted by the Board, we must 
ask ‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.’”  Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1239 (quoting Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 842).  “If it has not, we may not ‘simply impose 
[our] own construction on the statute.’”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).  “Rather, if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”  
Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).   
 
Our case law has already established that the term 
“particular social group” is undefined in the statute, and its 
meaning is unclear.  We have observed that “[b]oth courts 
and commentators have struggled to define ‘particular social 
group.’  Read in its broadest literal sense, the phrase is almost 
completely open-ended.”  Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 
594 (quoting Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1238).  The statutory language 
is “not very instructive” and there is scant evidence of 
legislative intent.  Id. (quoting Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1238).  Thus, 
the question before us now, as in the past, is whether the 
Board’s interpretation of that ambiguous term is a reasonable 
one.14 
                                              
14 Although initially contending that the BIA’s new 
interpretation fails Chevron step one, S.E.R.L. acknowledged 
at oral argument that the Chevron framework applies, and that 
the term “particular social group” is ambiguous.  We agree 
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S.E.R.L. contends that the BIA’s change in 
nomenclature from “social visibility” to “social distinction” is 
the only change the BIA has made to its test for assessing a 
“particular social group,” and, she says, that is a “distinction 
without a difference.” (Reply Br. at 5.)  According to 
S.E.R.L., our decision in Valdiviezo-Galdamez forecloses 
application of the “particularity” and “social distinction” 
requirements.  She also argues that the BIA plainly 
acknowledges that it has not changed course, nor has it 
provided a “principled” explanation for why it continues to 
impose criteria we rejected in Valdiviezo-Galdamez.  
(Opening Br. at 31.)   
 
In addition, those who have filed amicus briefs in this 
case point out that the BIA’s decisions in M-E-V-G- and 
W-G-R- could be read as inconsistent with certain other BIA 
decisions and contrary to the canon of ejusdem generis.  
Amici note, for example, that in W-G-R-, the BIA concluded 
that “‘former members of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador 
who have renounced their gang membership’ does not 
constitute a particular social group” in part because “the 
group could include persons of any age, sex, or background.”  
26 I. & N. Dec. at 221.  Yet, even though the groups varied 
significantly across age, sex, and background, the BIA has 
also held that “Filipinos of Chinese [a]ncestry” constituted a 
“particular social group,” In re V-T-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 792, 
798 (BIA 1997), and that “former member[s] of the national 
                                                                                                     
and thus proceed directly to step two.  See Valdiviezo-
Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 603 (rejecting the petitioner’s 
argument that the BIA’s particularity and social visibility 
requirements were contrary to the intent of the INA).   
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police” in El Salvador, Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 662, 
likewise could be cognizable.15  And although the BIA 
expressly justified its new requirements as “[c]onsistent with 
the interpretive canon ‘ejusdem generis,’” M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & 
N. Dec. at 234, amici highlight that some of the enumerated 
grounds for persecution, including “political opinion,” and 
“religion,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), may themselves be 
thought of as amorphous, diffuse, or subjective and therefore 
as insufficient bases for PSGs under M-E-V-G-’s 
requirements. 
 
Those critiques raise legitimate concerns.  The BIA 
has chosen to maintain a three-part test for determining the 
existence of a particular social group, and it has discussed 
how the revised particularity and social distinction 
requirements are not a departure from but a ratification of 
requirements articulated in its prior decisions.  M-E-V-G-, 26 
I. & N. Dec. at 234.  And the arguable inconsistencies in its 
precedent highlight the risk that those requirements could be 
applied arbitrarily and interpreted to impose an unreasonably 
high evidentiary burden, especially for pro se petitioners, at 
the threshold.  At the same time, however, we recognize that 
M-E-V-G- is a relatively recent decision and clarity and 
consistency can be expected to emerge with the accretion of 
case law.  That process is aided by M-E-V-G- itself, which 
                                              
15 Although S.E.R.L. also relies heavily on Matter of 
A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), where the BIA 
had held that “married women in Guatemala who are unable 
to leave their relationship” constituted a particular social 
group, the Attorney General recently issued a decision 
overruling A-R-C-G-.  See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 
316 (A.G. 2018). 
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addressed the specific concerns we raised in Valdiviezo-
Galdamez, and explained why the particularity and social 
distinction requirements are different from one another and 
necessary.  We now consider each of those requirements, 
beginning with social distinction, to explain why, 
notwithstanding our concerns, we conclude that the 
requirements are reasonable and warrant Chevron deference. 
 
1. Social Distinction 
 
“Social distinction” means social recognition, or 
“whether the people of a given society would perceive a 
proposed group as sufficiently separate or distinct[.]”  
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 241.  The BIA has clarified that 
“social distinction” is not a matter of being “seen” by society 
in an “ocular” sense, as one might have understood from 
decisions applying the old “social visibility” factor.  Id. at 
240.  The change in terminology from “social visibility” to 
“social distinction” was intended to resolve any 
“misconception” that literal visibility was a requirement.  Id. 
at 236.  As defined in M-E-V-G-, social distinction accounts 
for the particular social groups that the BIA has recognized in 
the past and wishes to continue to recognize, including those 
whose members share an immutable, though not literally 
visible, characteristic.16  See id. at 244-45 (addressing 
                                              
16 S.E.R.L. argues that the Board’s interpretation in 
M-E-V-G- is unreasonable because the petitioners that 
prevailed in several earlier cases could not have satisfied the 
new test on the record before the agency in those cases.  If 
that were the litmus for assessing an agency’s revised 
interpretation, however, then its first interpretation would be 
all but set in stone.  The Supreme Court has expressly 
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Kasinga, Toboso-Alfonso, and Fuentes).  The Board thus 
addressed our concern in Valdiviezo-Galdamez that it had 
seemingly defined “social visibility” in “the literal sense” and 
had been applying it inconsistently.  Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 
663 F.3d at 606 (quoting Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430). 
 
S.E.R.L. nevertheless suggests that by defining the 
“social distinction” factor as based on the perception of the 
society in question rather than by the perception of the 
persecutor, the Board has impermissibly conflated the INA’s 
“particular social group” and “nexus” requirements, rendering 
the test set forth in Matter of M-E-V-G- an unreasonable 
interpretation.  We disagree, and we are not the first court to 
do so.   
 
Reviewing the companion case to M-E-V-G-, the Ninth 
Circuit considered and rejected a similar challenge.  In Reyes 
v. Lynch, the court concluded that “the ‘social distinction’ 
requirement is not redundant in light of the ‘nexus’ 
requirement for asylum and withholding claims.”  842 F.3d 
1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2016) (reviewing W-G-R-), cert. denied 
sub nom. Reyes v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018).  “Rather 
than conflate the ‘social distinction’ and ‘nexus’ 
requirements,” the court said, “the BIA’s reasoning reflects 
                                                                                                     
rejected such a rigid standard and has acknowledged that an 
agency “must consider varying interpretations and the 
wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis,” Rust v. Sullivan, 
500 U.S. 173, 186 (1991) (citation omitted), and, when it 
concludes that deviation is required, that it “display 
awareness that it is changing position” and “provide reasoned 
explanation” for the change, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 
Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (emphasis omitted). 
31 
 
an appreciation of the need to distinguish between the 
showing an applicant must make in order to demonstrate 
membership in a ‘particular social group’ and the showing 
that is necessary to demonstrate that he was persecuted, or 
fears persecution, ‘on account of’ that membership.”  Id.; see 
also I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) 
(explaining that the INA “makes motive critical” and 
requiring that an asylum applicant present evidence of his 
persecutors’ motives to satisfy the “nexus” requirement).  
That reasoning is entirely persuasive. 
 
It is well within the bounds of reasonableness for the 
BIA to interpret the term “particular social group” in the INA 
as requiring evidence that the society in question recognizes a 
proposed group as distinct.  The persecutor’s motive may be 
relevant but is not alone sufficient in that regard.  See 
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 243.  Otherwise, every act of 
persecution could be claimed as being on the basis of a 
protected ground, since the internal motivations of a 
persecutor are likely to be more obscure than are the 
perceptions of a society generally.  Also, one bad actor’s 
twisted views should not be attributed to a whole society.  We 
therefore agree with the Ninth Circuit that the BIA’s 
interpretation better maintains the distinction between 
“particular social group” and the “nexus” requirement. 
 
Finally, although we are cognizant of arguable 
inconsistencies in its application to date and the need for 
careful review by the BIA and this Court to ensure a fair and 
principled approach, we reject the suggestion by S.E.R.L. and 
amici that the BIA’s social distinction requirement is 
categorically incapable of rational application and that the 
BIA has failed to “provide meaningful guidance about how 
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one would establish social distinction.”  (Reply Br. at 17.)  In 
M-E-V-G-, the BIA described the kind of evidence that a 
petitioner could rely on, stating “[e]vidence such as country 
conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and press 
accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical 
animosities, and the like may establish that a group exists and 
is perceived as ‘distinct’ … in a particular society.”  26 I. & 
N. Dec. at 244.  We do not read that list as exclusive, and it is 
not unlike evidence the Board relies on in petitions alleging 
persecution on account of other enumerated grounds.  See 
generally Sheriff v. Att’y Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 592 (3d Cir. 
2009) (discussing regulations “explicitly envision[ing] that 
the BIA will consider Country Reports” and other official 
documents); Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 169-71, 177 (noting the 
use of testimonial, documentary, and expert evidence).  Thus, 
we conclude that the social distinction requirement is a 
reasonable feature of the BIA’s interpretation of “particular 
social group.” 
 
2. Particularity 
 
Likewise, the particularity requirement is reasonable.  
The word “particular” is in the text of the statute, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42)(A), and it is sensible to construe that word as 
requiring an alleged social group to have “discrete and … 
definable boundaries” that are not “amorphous, overbroad, 
diffuse, or subjective,” M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239, so 
as to provide a clear standard for determining who is a 
member of it, W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214.  The BIA has 
explained that the “particularity requirement … clarif[ies] the 
point, at least implicit in earlier case law, that not every 
immutable characteristic is sufficiently precise to define a 
particular social group.” Id. at 213.  For example, in Escobar 
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v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2005), a proposed 
particular social group defined by “[p]overty, homelessness, 
and youth” was held to be “too vague and all encompassing” 
to set discernible parameters.  Id. at 368.17   
 
Given its explicit roots in the statute and the sensible 
explanation of a need for some measure of definitional 
precision, the particularity requirement is also a reasonable 
feature of the BIA’s interpretation of “particular social 
group.” 
 
                                              
17 See also, e.g., S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584-85 
(stating that “the key question is whether the proposed 
description is sufficiently particular, or is too amorphous ... to 
create a benchmark for determining group membership,” and 
rejecting the proposed group of “male children who lack 
stable families and meaningful adult protection, who are from 
middle and low income classes, who live in the territories 
controlled by the MS-13 gang, and who refuse recruitment” 
as too amorphous (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)); A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. at 76-77 (explaining that “affluent Guatemalans” did not 
qualify as a particular social group in part because the 
“characteristic of wealth or affluence is simply too subjective, 
inchoate, and variable to provide the sole basis for 
membership”); C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 959, 961 (rejecting a 
proposed group of “noncriminal drug informants working 
against the Cali drug cartel” due, in part, to the fact that the 
distinction between government informants who had been 
compensated for their services and those who acted out of 
civic motives was not sufficient to carve out a particular 
“subgroup” of uncompensated informants). 
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3. The BIA has adequately distinguished 
social distinction and particularity 
 
We had expressed concern in Valdiviezo-Galdamez 
that “social visibility” (now “social distinction”) and 
“particularity” were really two ways of saying the same thing.  
663 F.3d at 608.  But the BIA has adequately articulated why 
it deems the ideas to be separate and why both are needed.  In 
the BIA’s reasoning, “social distinction” works to narrow the 
universe of “particular social groups” to those whose 
members are seen to be “distinct” or “other,” like the 
distinctiveness inherent in the other enumerated grounds of 
race, religion, nationality, and political opinion, while 
“particularity” ensures that a group has “discrete … 
boundaries” capable of a common, accepted definition.  
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239-40, 244.  We agree that 
particularity and social distinction address different aspects of 
whether an applicant has established a particular social 
group.18  Although they may often involve similar evidence, 
which the BIA readily acknowledges, id. at 241, that alone is 
not a basis to reject them as being indistinguishable.   
 
Some overlap is to be expected, given that each 
requirement is meant to illuminate whether a particular social 
group exists in the society in question.  See id. (“[The 
requirements] overlap because the overall definition is 
applied in the fact-specific context of an applicant’s claim for 
                                              
18 The Ninth Circuit has also concluded that the two 
requirements are sufficiently distinct.  See Reyes, 842 F.3d at 
1135-37 (discussing differences between social distinction 
and particularity). 
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relief.”).  But particularity and social distinction are different 
in an important respect:  the former is essentially an objective 
inquiry, asking whether a reasonable person could look at the 
proposed definition of a social group and determine who falls 
within it, whereas the latter poses a more subjective question, 
whether the alien’s home society actually does recognize that 
group as being a “distinct” and identifiable group.  Inquiring 
separately about objective and subjective perspectives is a 
familiar task in the law19 and is not out of bounds in this 
context.  For example, “[t]he well-found fear of persecution 
standard involves both a subjectively genuine fear of 
persecution and an objectively reasonable possibility of 
persecution.”  Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 590-91.  In 
short, we are satisfied that the BIA has explained why the two 
requirements are not really just the same thing done over. 
 
The BIA has also explained why it views the addition 
of “social distinction” and “particularity” as necessary 
limitations on the Acosta test.  It noted its concern that 
Acosta’s immutable characteristic requirement resulted in 
“confusion and a lack of consistency as adjudicators struggled 
with various possible social groups, some of which appeared 
to be created exclusively for asylum purposes.”  M-E-V-G-, 
26 I. & N. Dec. at 231.  The additional requirements of social 
                                              
19 See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 
(2001) (describing Fourth Amendment inquiry as involving 
“a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as 
reasonable”); United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 596 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)’s prohibition on 
transmitting communications containing a threat to injure 
another as including “both a subjective and objective 
component”), cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 67 (2017).   
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distinction and particularity arose from the BIA’s experience 
adjudicating prior cases and its desire to give further 
guidance.  When, in Valdiviezo-Galdamez, we remanded for 
the Board to give a “principled reason” and explanation for 
the added requirements, we indeed hoped to receive what we 
asked for and did not intend to foreclose any additions to the 
original Acosta test.  Id. at 608; see also id. at 612 (Hardiman, 
J., concurring) (stating that “remand is necessary so the Board 
can either choose between its reasonable new requirements 
and its older but equally reasonable precedents, or reconcile 
the two interpretations in a coherent way”); cf. Negusie, 555 
U.S. at 525 (Scalia, J., and Alito, J., concurring) (“I would not 
agree to remand if I did not think that the [BIA] has the 
option of adhering to its decision.  The majority appears to 
leave that question undecided[.]”).  S.E.R.L. is thus mistaken 
in reading Valdiviezo-Galdamez as precluding the three-part 
test the BIA adopted in M-E-V-G-.   
 
We are not alone in deferring to the BIA’s better 
explained interpretation of “particular social group.”  Since 
we issued our decision in Valdiviezo-Galdamez, the majority 
of our sister circuits have applied the test from M-E-V-G-, 
including the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.20  Moreover, in Reyes, the 
                                              
20 See Perez-Rabanales v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 61, 66 
(1st Cir. 2018) (applying BIA’s interpretation in M-E-V-G- 
and rejecting proffered social group of “Guatemalan women 
who try to escape systemic and severe violence but who are 
unable to receive official protection”); Pacas-Renderos v. 
Sessions, 691 F. App’x 796, 804 (4th Cir. 2017) (applying 
criteria from M-E-V-G-); Hernandez-De La Cruz v. Lynch, 
819 F.3d 784, 786-87 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2016) (endorsing BIA’s 
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Ninth Circuit expressly endorsed the BIA’s interpretation of 
“particular social group” and granted it Chevron deference.  
See 842 F.3d at 1135 (concluding that “particularity” and 
“social distinction” are reasonable requirements).  The wide 
acceptance of the BIA’s revised test from M-E-V-G-, and, in 
particular, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the companion case, 
W-G-R-, constitute persuasive support for our conclusion 
today.  Cf. In re Grossman’s Inc., 607 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (explaining that the “widely held views [of 
other circuit courts] impel us to consider whether the 
reasoning applied by our colleagues elsewhere is 
persuasive”).  Independent of Chevron, we are constrained to 
acknowledge again that our role in the process of construing 
the term “particular social group” is rightly limited.  As the 
Supreme Court has noted, courts are neither policy-makers 
nor diplomats; we are ill-suited for those roles.  Negusie, 555 
U.S. at 516-17.  Immigration policy properly resides with the 
elected branches of government. 
 
And, of course, we are not operating independently of 
the rule in Chevron.  Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1239.  The Chevron 
doctrine of deference to federal agencies is open to question, 
                                                                                                     
interpretation); Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 498-
99 (6th Cir. 2015) (same); Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780 
F.3d 982, 992 (10th Cir. 2015) (concluding that M-E-V-G- 
and W-G-R- are “consistent with [the court’s] past 
interpretation of social visibility”); Juarez Chilel v. Holder, 
779 F.3d 850, 855 (8th Cir. 2015) (endorsing BIA’s 
interpretation); Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 
2014) (granting the BIA’s interpretation in M-E-V-G- 
Chevron deference); Chavez v. Att’y Gen., 571 F. App’x 861, 
864-65 (11th Cir. 2014) (applying criteria from M-E-V-G-). 
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see Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th 
Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron and Brand X 
permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of 
core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal 
power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to 
square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.”), but it is 
the law, and it allows the BIA to change its statutory 
interpretation and still be entitled to full deference from 
Article III courts, see Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (“Agency 
inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the 
agency’s interpretation under the Chevron framework.”).  All 
that is required is that the agency provide a “reasoned 
explanation” for its interpretation.  Id. at 1000.  The BIA has 
done so here, and because the three-part test endorsed in 
M-E-V-G- is based on a “reasonable construction of the 
statute, whether or not it is the only possible interpretation or 
… the one [we] might think best,” that test prevails.21  Holder 
v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583, 591 (2012). 
                                              
21 At the same time, we are mindful of the role that 
courts can and must play to ensure that agencies comply with 
their “obligation to render consistent opinions,” Chisholm v. 
Def. Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 47 (3d Cir. 1981), 
including, as relevant here, review of BIA decisions for 
inconsistent application of M-E-V-G’s requirements to 
similarly situated petitioners, routine rejection of proposed 
PSGs without reasoned explanation, and the imposition of 
insurmountable evidentiary burdens that would render 
illusory the opportunity to establish a PSG.  However, just as 
we will carefully examine cases on petition for review to 
guard against such dangers, we anticipate that the BIA will 
scrutinize the IJ decisions that come before it with those 
39 
 
  D. S.E.R.L. Has Not Established 
Membership in a Cognizable 
Particular Social Group 
 
Having concluded that the BIA’s interpretation is 
entitled to Chevron deference, we now consider S.E.R.L.’s 
claim that her proposed particular social group – immediate 
family members of Honduran women unable to leave a 
domestic relationship – nevertheless satisfies the test from 
M-E-V-G-.  To prevail on her asylum and withholding of 
removal claims, S.E.R.L. bore the burden of both alleging a 
cognizable particular social group as well as establishing her 
membership in that group based on evidence of record.  
Although “[t]he BIA is not permitted simply to ignore or 
misconstrue evidence” in the record, Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y 
Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 114 (3d Cir. 2010), we may only reverse 
factual findings if we conclude that “the evidence ‘compels’ a 
different result.”  Kang, 611 F.3d at 164 (quoting Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481).  We agree with the BIA’s 
conclusion that S.E.R.L. has not satisfied the social 
distinction requirement. 
 
S.E.R.L. focuses on the legal aspect of our inquiry, 
arguing that her proposed social group must be cognizable 
because it comprises two groups that the BIA has already 
recognized as meeting the particularity and social distinction 
requirements:  “women of a particular nationality who are 
trapped in abusive relationships,” and “immediate family.”  
(Reply Br. at 1.)  She illustrates her argument by way of a 
Venn diagram, suggesting that her group constitutes a 
                                                                                                     
considerations in mind and with an eye towards providing 
clear guidance and a coherent body of law in this area. 
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particular social group as a matter of logic.  While her 
reasoning has some superficial appeal, it is flawed, and we 
reject it for two reasons. 
 
First, and most fundamentally, it ignores the factual 
feature in determining whether a particular social group is 
cognizable.  The BIA has repeatedly stated that the particular 
social group determination depends on the facts of the case at 
hand.  See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233-34 (“The particular 
kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this 
construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.”); accord Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 42 
(BIA 2017); M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 251.  And that 
must naturally be so, once it is given that social distinction 
involves proof of societal views.  What those views are and 
how they may differ from one society to another are questions 
of fact upon which the ultimate legal question of cognizability 
rests.  Consequently, it does not follow that because the BIA 
has accepted that one society recognizes a particular group as 
distinct that all societies must be seen as recognizing such a 
group.  Kinship, marital status, and domestic relationships can 
each be a defining characteristic of a particular social group, 
but that does not mean that adding two or more of those 
characteristics together necessarily establishes a cognizable 
particular social group.  In fact, that kind of addition may well 
broaden, rather than narrow, a group such that the society in 
question would not recognize it as distinct.  Thus, as a matter 
of logic, it is invalid to assert that proof in one context is 
proof in all contexts. 
 
Second and closely related, the Board made an 
important factual distinction between this case and its prior 
decision in Matter of A-R-C-G-.  S.E.R.L. relies heavily on 
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that decision, in which the Board considered a group 
consisting of married female victims of domestic violence.  
Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 390-95 (BIA 2014), 
overruled by Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 
2018).  Importantly, however, A-R-C-G- was premised on 
“DHS’s concession that a particular social group exist[ed],” 
based on “unrebutted evidence that Guatemala has a culture 
of ‘machismo and family violence.’” Id. at 394 (citation 
omitted).  And, as earlier noted, see supra n.15, A-R-C-G- has 
recently been abrogated by the Attorney General, who stated 
that it “caused confusion because it recognized an expansive 
new category of particular social groups based on private 
violence.”  Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 319. 
 
Here, relying on M-E-V-G- and A-R-C-G-, the BIA 
concluded that S.E.R.L.’s proposed group failed, in part 
because she had not identified sufficient evidence that 
immediate family members of Honduran women unable to 
leave a domestic relationship are viewed as socially distinct 
within Honduran society.   
 
S.E.R.L. argues that the Board’s decision is 
indefensible, because the record parallels what was presented 
in A-R-C-G-.  She points to evidence, including country 
reports documenting violence against Honduran women, 
Honduran laws enacted to protect women and victims of 
domestic abuse, and evidence suggesting that those laws are 
underenforced, as well as a Honduran initiative to combat 
violence against women.  But that evidence does not compel 
the conclusion that S.E.R.L.’s broader proposed group, which 
encompasses family members of domestic abuse victims – 
including family members who are male or female, young or 
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old, and live with or apart from the victims – is socially 
distinct.   
 
We do not read the BIA’s opinion as, in effect, 
“ignor[ing] S.E.R.L.’s evidence of rampant violence against 
women and their families in Honduras.”  (Reply Br. at 17, 
18.)  To be sure, the record includes disturbing evidence of 
crime, gang-related violence, and general human rights 
abuses, including gender-based violence against women in 
Honduras.  The Board, however, noted the lack of evidence in 
the record establishing that “members of [S.E.R.L.’s 
proposed] group would be perceived, considered, or 
recognized in Honduras as a distinct group[.]”  (AR at 5.)  
Although arguing that the BIA should not be free to credit or 
ignore evidence or avoid analyzing precedent just by claiming 
that the issue before it is different, S.E.R.L. fails to direct us 
to anything in the record that the IJ or BIA has ignored and 
that would compel the conclusion that Honduran society 
perceives immediate family members of women who cannot 
leave domestic relationships as constituting a socially distinct 
group.  Thus, even if such a group were still cognizable after 
the Attorney General’s recent decision overruling A-R-C-G-, 
the argument for granting the petition for review in this case 
fails.  
 
S.E.R.L.’s criticism of the BIA’s analysis strikes at the 
heart of the Board’s discretion to adopt additional 
requirements for identifying a particular social group and its 
ability to apply those requirements on a case-by-case basis.  
That criticism may or may not be valid but, in any event, 
should be directed to Congress.  As the law stands now, the 
BIA has the discretion it exercised, and while it remains to be 
seen whether the application of those requirements proves 
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principled and consistent, what matters for our purposes is 
that they are capable of such application.  Martinez Gutierrez, 
566 U.S. at 591, 596.  In light of the deference owed to the 
BIA’s view of the INA, and after reviewing the record as a 
whole, we conclude that S.E.R.L. has not met her burden of 
showing that the evidence here compels the conclusion that 
her proposed social group is viewed in Honduras as being 
socially distinct.22 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth, we will deny S.E.R.L.’s 
petition for review.23 
                                              
22 Because we agree that S.E.R.L. has not adduced 
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of her proposed 
particular social group, we do not reach any of the other bases 
for the BIA’s denial of her application for asylum and 
withholding of removal, and her final argument suggesting 
that remand is required for the agency to address her well-
founded fear of persecution by Juan Orellana is moot. 
 
23 S.E.R.L.’s outstanding motion to supplement the 
record will also be denied.  That motion is premised on a 
motion to reopen proceedings before the BIA.  The BIA 
denied her motion, and S.E.R.L. has not appealed that 
decision.  Thus, her motion and the new evidence it discusses 
are not properly before us.  See Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 
F.3d 202, 218 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that we “must approve 
or reject the agency’s action purely on the basis of the reasons 
offered by, and the record compiled before, the agency itself” 
(citation omitted)). 
